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CGIAR’s GOVERNANCEAND~RGANJZATION: 
ISTHERENEEDFORCHANGE? 
This paper explores alternatives to the CGIAR’s present governance and organization model. A 
number of questions are raised to promote discussion within the system about ways of improving the 
system’s governance and decision-making structure. The Oversight Committee plans to bring to the 
CGIAR a set of concrete recommendations on governance and organization for consideration at ICW 94. 
The Committee suggests to follow the initial discussion of the issues at the MTM 94 with a commissioned 
study on governance and decision-making before formulating its recommendations to the CGIAR. The 
purpose of the discussion as MTM 94 is to gain a sense of the direction the system should move on 
governance. 
The starting premise of the paper is that structural change is a means to an end and that, before 
embarking on change, strong justification is needed for both the end itself and the potential effect of the 
proposed means (alternative structure) on the end. An analysis of structures, therefore, must start with 
the goals one is trying to achieve or the problems one is trying to solve through structural change and 
other means. 
A second premise is that structural aspects of the CGIAR cannot be studied in isolation from 
other aspects, most notably, the system’s vision and strategy, its mode of financing, its interface with its 
clients and partners, and political considerations which surround the operations of the centers and the 
system. This means that discussions on structure must take explicit account of these other dimensions 
and explore their connections with structure. 
PART LBACKGROUND 
DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS 
The CGIAR operates with five defining characteristics which have remained essentially unchanged 
since its founding 22 years ago: 
1. Shared Vision. The system was created to address the world food problem based on the 
belief that investments in scientific research would generate improved agricultural 
technologies, practices, and policies to enable developing countries to produce more food 
at lower cost per unit. The system’s major thrusts have been productivity increase, 
poverty alleviation, and resource conservation. As the linkage between environment and 
agriculture has become more evident, the CGIAR system has oriented its programs 
increasingly toward sustainability and has, at the same time, expanded its efforts 
addressing important new areas of the land-use continuum. Throughout, the system has 
exhibited a deep commitment to excehence, which is a value shared by all components 
of the CGIAR. 
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2. Donor Sovereignty. Each donor is free to choose the level and composition of its 
contributions to the centers and, subject to some centralized functions such as audits and 
reviews, the way that it interacts with the centers. Each donor acts in a non-political 
manner. 
3. Center Autonomy. Each center is an autonomous legal entity, has its own independent 
governing board (members serve in individual capacities), and independently formulates 
its own goals and strategies (in light of signals received from donors, NARSs, TAC, and 
the CGlAR). 
4. Independent Technical Advice. An independent group of technical experts, unbeholden 
to donors or centers, provides technical guidance. 
5. Consensus Decision-Making. No formal vote is taken. Consensus is “sensed” and 
announced by the Chairman following discussion and, when necessary, informal 
consultations among members at and between meetings. 
These guiding principles have been the bedrock of the CGIAR, accounting for a large degree of the credit 
for its success as an institution. 
GWERNANCE AND ORGANIZATION 
The CGIAR’s present governance and organization is essentially the same as the initial structure 
put in place at the time of the system’s founding 22 years ago. However some changes have been made 
recently and more are under consideration. This basic structure is made up of four main components: 
1. The Consultative Group serves as the system-wide deliberative and decision-making 
body of the CGIAR. It is made up of a Chairman, Co-sponsors, donors, fixed-term 
representatives, and two recently established standing committees: an Oversight 
Committee and a Finance Committee. The Consultative Group is an informal association 
with no legal personality. 
2. International Centers are the operating units of the system. Each center is an 
autonomous entity with international legal personality and is managed by a self- 
perpetuating governing board. 
3. Partners and Clients share purposes similar to those of the Consultative Group and 
collaborate with donors and centers in carrying out activities supported by the CGIAR. 
4. A Central Structure advises and assists the Consultative Group and the centers in its 
decision-making and operation. This includes the Technical Advisory Committee (YTAC), 
with its Secretariat at FAO in Rome, and the Secretariat of the Consultative Group at the 
World Bank in Washington, D.C. 
OP~~RT~N~I~E~ AND CONCERNS 
Concerns in several fronts are driving the CGIAR to consider changes in governance and 
organization. These include: 
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1. Increased complexity. The system had a relatively sharp focus and distinctive identity when it 
started out in the early 1970s. The emphasis on food production was complemented with 
emphasis on equity, sustainability, the environment, and strengthening national agricultural 
research systems (NARS) in developing countries. Thus, over time, particularly since the 
system’s expansion, the number of objectives pursued by the system has increased. 
One consequence of increased complexity is that, from a system perspective, orchestrating change 
has become difficult because of the system’s decentralized structure (e.g., centers pulling in 
different directions) and the slowness of its system-wide processes for initiating and responding 
to change. A clearer statement of the CGIAR’s vision and strategy will help, as noted by most 
respondents to the questionnaire survey of the CGIAR community conducted by the Oversight 
Committee. A new vision would facilitate identification of the key structural anchors needed for 
any redesign of the CGIAR’s organization. 
2. Pressures for further decentralization. There is a concern that the system might be moving 
towards further decentralization of its activities - in the sense of donors increasingly supporting 
restricted, market-driven activities in the project mode. Proliferation of such funding behavior 
would most likely lead to having lower levels of funds available for the system’s core activities. 
Less support for core activities means less impact by the system in the generation of the most 
needed public goods. 
3. Limitations of funding modalities. The CGIAR has been remarkably successful in the past in 
carrying out a long-term research program in spite of having only a short-term funding 
mechanism, but that success is threatened. The basic weakness of such a system became most 
evident during the current funding slump, the most serious in the CGIAR’s history. An annual 
funding mechanism with often late announcements and payments by donors has put in jeopardy 
the continuity of the long-term strategic research programs supported by the CGIAR. Efforts are 
underway, in the first instance, to stabilize funding, and, second, to put in place financing 
modalities to ensure continuity and stability of the vital, long-term programs of the CGIAR. 
A different financing mode could require changes in CGIAR’s governance. For example, if part 
of the donor funds were to be placed in a central pool, a new mechanism may be needed for 
managing the pool. If developing countries benefitting from the CGIAR’s research were to 
contribute more to financing certain aspects of the system, the current mechanisms for system and 
center governance may need to be modified to increase their participation. 
4. New research partnership modes. Throughout its history the CGIAR has relied on the concept 
of “international centers of excellence” as the organizational units for carrying out its programs. 
While networks, consortia and other organizational forms also exist within the system, these are 
subsidiary program implementation instruments used by the centers, not free standing 
organizational units. 
There is now much greater partnership and interdependence in solving common problems among 
researchers and research institutions in developed and developing countries than what existed 
during the initial two decades of the CGIAR. Sooner or later the CGIAR will need to consider 
whether, institutionally, the system should continue implementing its programs only through 
international centers. Program funding and a pool of competitively allocated funds, in addition 
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to funding of institutions, is now being examined. Such changes will call for adjustments in the 
structure of governance and management in the CGIAR. 
5. CGIAR’s interface with NARS. Each center manages its own interface with NARS based on 
its own goals and programs and each has developed its own unique ways of relating to NARS. 
When viewed from a system perspective, the collection of heterogeneous modes of interaction 
by the centers with institutions in the same countries introduces some element of confusion, at 
least on the part of NARS, and some duplication of effort among the centers. NARS 
representatives frequently observe that there is no single focus for their contact with the system 
and that what may be efficient for individual centers is not necessarily efficient for them. 
Whether the answer lies in having system-wide norms for addressing client interface problems 
is an open question. But what is clear is that a large part of the NARS interface issue is 
structural. Changes in vision, financing modalities, and partnership modes would most likely 
bring with them a demand for new NARS interface arrangements. 
6. The system’s responsiveness to change. Events in recent years have demonstrated that, as a 
system, the CGIAR is cumbersome and slow in responding to change. Many centers are 
frustrated because, although they are faster in responding to change, changes they would have 
to initiate are delayed because these depend on signals to come from the CGIAR. Thus, the 
system has been making adjustments at the level of individual vectors, but hardly at a level that 
cuts across all vectors. 
The CGIAR’s continued reliance on consensus decision-making has heavy time demands for 
building consensus on any change proposal. How the system manages its various system-wide 
functions, such as planning, resource allocation, resource mobilization, and evaluation, also has 
a bearing on its responsiveness. 
7. Performance concerns. In recent years many centers have experienced funding shortfalls, which 
they have had to weather by downsizing or otherwise adjusting their operations. The 
uncertainties in funding have affected staff morale, and the centers are facing the likelihood of 
losing some of their top staff. There is widespread belief that loss of top staff and continued low 
morale would lead to a drop in the system’s current and future potential to perform. 
8. Efficiency concerns. One consequence of the recent funding slump is the search by many 
components of the system for ways of increasing effkiency. Intra-center efficiency concerns have 
been or are being addressed by individual centers. What has not yet been examined sufficiently 
is the potential for increased efficiencies through new or streamlined inter-center and svstem-wide 
mechanisms. These fall broadly into three categories: 
a. Inter-center operations. There is potential to generate efficiencies by having the 
centers join forces in the delivery of some services, such as in the areas of training, 
information, and administrative support to center operations, or by creating system-wide 
programs as proposed for genetic resources. 
b. Center governance. There is some room for reducing the average board size and for 
streamlining board member perquisites. (In terms of their size, boards of individual 
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centers range from 8 to 17, with an average of 14.) There is also need to improve the 
accountability of individuai center boards and their members to the CGIAR. 
C. Costs of system management. Some of the processes used in managing the system’s 
affairs are not cost effective and could benefit from a reform. These primarily include 
the processes used for priority setting, impact assessment, resource allocation, resource 
mobilization, and external reviews. 
PARTII. STRUCTIJRAL CHANGE Omo~s 
ISTHERENEEDTOCHANGETHE 
GOVERNANCEOFTHECGI~? 
A question of first order is whether the CGIAR needs to change its governance model. The 
following reflects the Oversight Committee’s preliminary views on the subject. 
First, the CGIAR governance model (i.e., what constitutes the CGIAR, its component parts, and 
how it reaches its decisions) reflects a tried and tested balance among political, financial and science 
management considerations. Therefore any changes to the model would need to examine carefully what 
would be lost of the existing balances and help construct a new balance. 
Second, the informality of the CGIAR is a feature welcomed by its members. This applies both 
to the informality of its meetings, as well as the lack of a binding commitment from its members. Many 
consider this non-bureaucratic structure to be a more efficient way of conducting business than in a formal 
international organization. 
Third, in terms of its composition, the CGIAR is primarily a forum for donors who contribute 
to the system, from both developing and developed countries. Developing country views are represented 
in the forum both through donor members from developing countries and through fixed-term 
representatives (FTRs) selected through FAO’s regional conferences: This aspect of the CGIAR - 
whether it is an effective forum for incorporating key stakeholder views in its decisions - needs 
improvement. 
Fourth, in terms of decision-making, maintaining a consensus decision-making mode is becoming 
more difficult as the CGIAR’s membership grows and as it attempts to tackle an increasingly large 
decision agenda. The new committees appear to have helped some in terms of taking a first pass at issues 
before they are brought to the CGIAR, but they have no executive authority and cannot act for the 
CGIAR. 
Fifth, the CGIAR has no formal legal status. Alternative financing arrangements may require 
establishing the CGIAR as a formal entity. This alone would necessitate clarifying the membership of 
the CGIAR and the powers of its constituent parts. 
The OC is of the view that alternative governance and decision-making models should be studied 
to examine how the existing CGIAR model might be modified so that it can: 
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0 incorporate all major stakeholder views in its decisions; 
0 improve the efficiency of its own decision-making; and, 
0 accommodate alternative funding arrangements for the system’s operations. 
The OC plans to bring to the ICW 94 proposals reflecting the outcome of its continuing study 
of governance. The following are some initial thoughts on structural options within the.context of the 
CGIAR’s current governance model. 
POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS OF 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
A concept frequently used as a shorthand for a number of structural considerations in 
organizations is the degree of centralizationdecentralization. In general terms, this refers to the extent 
to which decision-making power is in the hands of a few or is dispersed among many within an 
organization. Although there are some conceptual diffkulties in capturing in a single dimension the many 
different patterns of distribution of power in an organization, centralization and decentralization are 
concepts familiar to many and could serve well as the descriptor for the overall direction of structural 
change in the CGIAR. 
An important distinction is between the organization of the CGIAR itself and the organization of 
the onerational arm of the svstem. This is important because one could introduce structural changes in 
one without necessarily having to significantly modify the other. For example, the CGIAR’s governance 
model could be modified without necessarily changing the autonomous center principle. 
For sake of simplicity, the possible directions of structural change in the CGIAR are described 
here in the following terms: 
0 greater centralization; 
0 greater decentralization; 
0 status quo with marginal adjustments. 
Greater centralization refers to situations where a much higher level of centralization is introduced 
to the system’s operational arm, the CGIAR itself, or both. Greater decentralization refers to the opposite 
case, where the operations and/or the superstructure of the system is more decentralized than at present. 
Marginal adiustments refers to less major changes in the CGIAR’s current governance and organization - 
- some in the centralization direction and some in the opposite direction. 
Option 1: Greater Centralization 
At the level of the CGIAR greater centralization means delegation of most system level decision 
making authority from the CGIAR itself to a smaller entity. At the level of the system’s operational arm, 
greater centralization implies management of the centers and CGIAR-wide programs (if any) by fewer 
than the present (or soon-to-be) 16 boards. 
There are several combinations of different levels of centralization at the center and the system 
level. What follows are three cases illustrating: (a) centralization at the system level with no change in 
the structure of the operational arm, (b) centralization of the operational arm with no change at the system 
level; and (c) partial centralization of the operational arm with no change at the system level. There are 
obviously other combinations, but these three are the only ones picked for illustrating the range of 
options. They are described under the folIowing headings: 
0 a CGIAR executive committee 
0 a single board for all centers 
0 divisionalized structure. 
Sub-option 1.1 A CGIAR Executive Committee. This option refers to the creation of a small 
executive committee with powers to act on behalf of the CGIAR between its meetings. This could be in 
the form of combined Oversight and Finance Committees or a new committee. The committee could be 
chaired by the CGIAR Chair and would be empowered to decide on administrative, financial and general 
system management matters. If there were central pooling of funds, this committee would be responsible 
for allocating it to the various centers and programs/activities supported by the system. Major system 
policy questions would be brought to the CGIAR for endorsement. 
. 
A move towards this type of centralization raises the issue of how the executive committee would 
be selected. This would depend on a number of questions, inchiding the following, which the Oversight 
Committee does not have adequate answers at present: 
0 Would longer-term financial commitments to the system be possible under the CGIAR’s 
current status as an informal organization, or would the contributors demand to have a 
formal entity to enter into agreements with, particularly to protect their commitments to 
a central pool? 
0 What would constitute the membership of the CGIAR? In addition to the donor 
members, would it be better to open the membership to all interested developing 
countries who are the partners of the system (such as in the Global Environmental 
Facility), or to limit membership to a few selected representatives of developing 
countries? 
0 How much decision-making authority would the members, particularly the donor 
members, be willing to delegate to an executive committee? What type of representation 
would best satisfy the requirements of the members? 
Under this option TAC would probably serve as advisor to the CGIAR as well as to its Executive 
Committee. The CGIAR itself would not need to meet more than once a year; it could even meet once 
in two or three years. The center system would remain decentralized, essentially as at present. If 
separate institutional arrangements are made for managing CGIAR-wide programs, oversight on these 
would also be among the responsibilities of the Executive Committee. 
Sub-option 1.2 A Single Board for All Centers. Under this option, the CGIAR would appoint 
one overarching board to manage the center system, with all chief executives of the centers and directors 
of CGIAR-wide programs reporting to it. This would be a board of about 15 persons, its composition 
reflecting the interests of donors, developing countries, and the scientific community. Selection of the 
board would be a major task of the CGIAR. 
The board would meet 4-6 times a year, for about 3 days each. Agenda at each meeting would 
cover a general review of the performance of all centers and programs, and a specific review of the 
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performance of a limited number of centers. When a specific institution requires special attention, the 
board could ask a few of its members to take responsibility for addressing the concern on behalf of the 
board. It could also establish a subsidiary board if a problem requires long-term oversight. 
The board would be responsible for managing the operations arm of the CGIAR, under the broad 
policy guidance of the CGIAR. The board would monitor the strategic directions of the system and 
propose changes to the CGIAR, it would appoint/dismiss directors, allocate “system funds,” oversee 
implementation of plans of the centers, etc. A small corporate office would handle the board’s day-today 
affairs. The IARCs’ administrative office in Washington could be a part of such a corporate offrce. 
The directors of the centers would have authority to manage the center’s operations and continue 
to shield the integrity of scientific programs. Centers could appoint small “scientific advisory boards” 
for programmatic advice. The current center boards could be turned into such advisory boards at least 
during the transition to the single board model. 
Under this sub-option many system management functions which are now handled by TAC, the 
CGIAR Secretariat and the donor committees, would be handled by the board. There would continue 
to be a need for an independent scientific advisory committee to advise the CGIAR and the board and 
to commission periodic external reviews of the centers and programs (to supplement internal reviews 
commissioned by the board and the individual centers). 
The CGIAR would probably not need to meet twice a year. In the annual CGIAR meeting the 
board would present a report on activities and plans, for endorsement by the CGIAR, following a 
commentary by the scientific advisory council. The CGIAR could continue to provide oversight on the 
operations of the centers through the two donor committees as now, or combine these two into a single 
committee. 
Sub-option 1.3 Divisionalized Structure. This is similar to the single board in concept, except 
that, instead of a single board, the CGIAR’s operations would be grouped under a few boards. The 
grouping could be done on an enterprise or business area basis or on a geographical basis, or both. For 
example, all CGIAR strategic research centers with global mandates could be grouped under one division, 
with the rest grouped under one or more geographic divisions. (Incidentally, having regional boards 
could strengthen the linkage between the regional operations of multilateral and bilateral donors and the 
CGIAR centers and enable greater regional participation in the governance of the system’s operations in 
each region.) Another example would be to partition the CGIAR operations into three “wings” covering 
research primarily directed towards: 
0 germplasm/productivity 
0 regional/agro-ecosystem concerns 
0 policy and management. 
The centers and programs under each wing could be managed by a separate board. 
The system level responsibilities would be much the same as in the case of the single board 
option. As a general rule, the system management role of the CGIAR would increase with the number 
of independent operations funded by the 
OPTION 2. GREATER DECENTRALIZATION 
Under a more decentralized structure, the CGIAR would function more truly as a marketplace, 
where investors and suppliers negotiate in an unencumbered fashion, with little or no system-wide strings 
attached to their transactions. Centers would be autonomous and free to respond to users as they see 
best, within the constraints imposed by financial support the centers are able to mobilize from the donors. 
There would be few if any system decisions. There would probably be a need for a technical advisory 
committee, but more for meeting the independent evaluation and quality control requirements of donors 
and for providing advice on needs for additional institutions. Donors would meet mainly for information 
sharing. There may also be need for a secretariat for servicing the needs of donors. There would be no 
central financial balancing mechanism. 
This option would minimize explicit concern on the system aspects of the CGIAR and leave 
questions on tradeoffs among centers to the market mechanism. Whatever guidance for the system would 
come form the market mechanism itself, i.e., from the donors and centers and the dialogue among them. 
TAC might be asked to analyze priorities for various activities and advise the CGIAR about globai 
research needs and the possible roles for the CGIAR. 
Under this option, the sovereignty of the donors would increase, as would the autonomy of the 
centers, and the system would maintain its informal character. There would be little system guidance by 
the CGIAR as there would practically be no “system” in the sense of a set of actors coordinating their 
actions for the benefit of a mutually shared purpose. Sovereign donors would be funding activities of 
autonomous centers through an informal consultation process but without the benefit of a system-wide 
perspective. In such a case it would probably be by chance that the resulting set of funded programs 
would correspond to the priority needs for international research globally. Some popular research 
activities would be oversubscribed to by donors, some centers would cease their research because they 
could not support the critical minimum mass of scientists required for maintaining a program, and some 
long-term research programs would face the risk of closure at mid-stream. 
The OC does not see this option as viable at the current stage of evolution of the CGIAR when 
the need to address problems of hunger, poverty, and environmental degradation globally asks for more 
collective and coordinated action. 
OPTION 3. STATUS Quo WITH MARGINAL ADJUSTMENTS 
This is an ad hoc adjustment model, the areas in which adjustments are to be made corresponding 
to some of the current concerns outlined in Part I of the paper. These areas include the following: 
0 center governance; 
0 CGIAR-wide programs; 
0 co-management of selective centers; 
0 business practices and responsibilities at the system level; 
0 representation of developing countries. 
Center governance. Action can be taken in two areas: size of boards and accountability of 
boards. Regarding &, average board size could be reduced from 14 to about 10. This is a question 
that should be addressed by all centers, particularly those with large boards. 
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Regarding accountability, present boards and their members have a weak sense of accountability 
to the CGIAR. Strengthening these accountabilities could help in the achievement of system-wide goals. 
Two measures could be taken: 
0 The system could play a stronger role in the selection of CGIAR nominees to center 
boards and in briefing these members on CGIAR policy/strategy matters on a regular 
basis; 
0 The system could inform &I board members about CGIAR policy/strategy matters on a 
regular basis. 
CGIAR-wide programs. If the CGIAR were to begin funding parts or the entirety of some 
global research programs, in addition to the funding of centers, there would be a need for a mechanism 
to oversee these programs. The mechanism needed in each case would depend on the specific 
circumstances of the program. These may take the form of less permanent oversight mechanisms such 
as a steering committee or a council. The workload of CGIAR and its committees would increase in 
proportion to the number of such programs. If the numbers warrant it, the CGIAR could establish a 
separate management structure to provide oversight to all such non-traditional system-wide activities. 
Co-management of selective centers. The CGIAR’s recent experience with IPGRI and INIBAP 
has introduced an alternative to its present center governance model - that of managing two separate 
activities through one board of trustees. This is an extension to the limit of the concept of having one 
or more common board members among two centers. In cases where close coordination of the activities 
of two or more centers is needed, the CGIAR could encourage the centers concerned to unify their boards 
while maintaining separate operations. This would help reduce the number of entities managed by the 
CGIAR from 16. 
Responsibilities and business practices at the system level. The responsibilities for central 
functions could be examined to reduce overlaps and enhance complementarities. In addition, the system’s 
business practices could be examined and modified to increase effkiency. 
Representation of Developing Countries. The planned study of alternative governance 
arrangements could point to ways of enhancing the effectiveness of developing country participation in 
the CGIAR, even if the CGIAR’s current organizational model remains the same. 
COMPARISON OF THE f&RUCTURAL OPTIONS 
A number of criteria can be used to compare the options described above. The primary criterion 
should be efficacy in achieving the system’s objectives. A second set of criteria is suggested by the type 
of concerns outlined at the beginning of the paper: 
0 stability of finance; 
0 integration of efforts; 
0 responsiveness to change; 
0 interface with NARS; 
0 promotion of interdependence among research actors; and, 
0 costs of transition from the present structure. 
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A third set is suggested by the system’s basic organizational principles: 
0 donor sovereignty; 
0 center autonomy; 
0 independent technical advice; and, 
0 informality/consensus decision-making. 
Under the central executive committee option the informality of the CGIAR would be reduced 
because of reduced reliance on consensus decision-making. Also, donors would lose some of their 
present sovereignty because they would delegate some of their system level decision-making power to the 
executive committee. They would, however, continue to support centers based on their preferences. The 
extent of erosion in their sovereignty would depend on the portion of their funds that are contributed to 
a central pool, instead of directly to the centers of their choice. 
Under this option centers would by-and-large maintain their autonomy because the centralization 
would effect the CGIAR’s superstructure and not its operational arm. The role of TAC would be 
somewhat reduced as it would have less power and influence over CGIAR’s decisions than at present. 
Under the single board option donors would continue to channel their contributions to the centers 
of their choice, but there may be need for some portion of the donor contributions to go into a central 
pool to give the board a degree of freedom in management of the system’s operations. They would hold 
the power to replace the board, if necessary. The reduction in donor sovereignty would be somewhat 
less than in the executive committee model because donors would not be delegating as much of their 
decision-making authority to the board. 
Being subject to the control of a single board would naturally reduce the autonomy of the 
individual centers. But autonomy of the scientific programs would be maintained. As in other 
centralization options, several functions now being carried out by TAC would be carried out by another 
central body. The system’s informality would continue as at present. 
The situation under the divisional&d structure would be essentially the same as under the single 
board, except that there would be more than one system-wide board. The centers would have slightly 
higher autonomy than in the single board model because they would be part of a smaller entity. 
As noted earlier, the decentralization option is not a viable option at this stage, although it is 
worth to note that this option merits high ratings in terms of donor sovereignty, center autonomy, and 
informality. 
The marginal adiustment option is likely to bring two notable improvements: in the interface with 
NARS and the efficiency of operations. In many ways this option represents the natural evolution of the 
CGIAR’s current governance and organization model. However, the marginal adjustment option offers 
only partial and limited response to the challenges currently faced by the system. 
PART III. CONCLUSIONS 
The CGIAR is a much larger and more complex system now than when it was established over 
20 years ago. Although the CGIAR has kept its defining characteristics and governance and organization 
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essentially unchanged during this period, the challenges that are being faced by the system have begun 
to stretch the limits of the basic principles underlying the CGIAR’s organizational model which it has 
preserved and protected so long. 
The choice for the CGIAR in the immediate future is clear. It should keep on improving the way 
the system is governed and organized, introducing adjustments to its structures, processes and principles 
in order to address today’s pressing concerns. In a separate note the Committee has made a number of 
specific recommendations for improvement which are subject to approval by the CGIAR at the MTM. 
The choice for the CGIAR in the longer-term is less clear. The Oversight Committee feels that 
it is time for the system to seriously explore alternatives to the CGIAR’s present governance and 
organization model. This paper was intended to provide some food for thought in this area. 
The cursory analysis in the paper indicates that it would be worthwhile to examine in greater 
detail various forms and gradations of a more centralized structure for the CGIAR. It appears that 
leaving structures as they are might lead to greater decentralization of activities and diffusion of funds, 
and place the system’s most essential activities at some risk. The CGIAR’s deliberations at the MTM 
94 should show (1) if the need for structural change is shared widely within the system, and, (2) if there 
is strong consensus on the need for change, what would be the preferred direction of change. 
‘Ihe Oversight Committee suggests to commission an external study of the CGIAR’s governance 
and system-wide decision-making and financing arrangements, to be completed by September 1994 so 
that the Committee can formulate its recommendations, in consultation with the Finance Committee, for 
the CGIAR’s consideration at ICW 94. A draft terms-of-reference for the study is attached in Annex 1. 
The Oversight Committee welcomes comments on the ideas put forth in this paper. 
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ANNEX1 
DRAIT TERMS-OF REFERENCE 
FOR A STUTIY ON THE CGIAR’s GOVERNANCE 
AND DECISION-MAKING 
OVERALL PURPOSE: 
recommend ways of improving the CGIAR’s governance and system-wide decision-making and 
financing arrangements within the context of the system’s vision and strategy and the challenges 
and opportunities it faces. 
OBJECTlWS: 
To identify the strengths and weaknesses of the CGIAR’s present governance and decision-making 
structure; 
To compare the CGIAR’s governance and decision-making structure with those of similar 
international undertakings; 
To examine the CGIAR’s financial arrangements (such as mobihzation and allocation of funds) 
and assess their links with governance and decision-making; 
To develop options for governance, system-wide decision-making, and financing for the CGIAR; 
Analyze the implications of these options, including their costs and benefits and influence on the 
system’s defining characteristics; 
To prepare a brief report summarizing key recommendations and their rationale. 
TIhIlZTABLE: 
Study to be initiated by the Oversight Committee by June 1994 and completed by August 31, 
1994. 
